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We present a theory of family ownership as a driver of the heterogeneity (between-firm 
differences) and variability (within-firm differences over time) of absorptive capacity (AC). We 
introduce the concepts of motivation and implementation gaps to explain why, paradoxically, 
family ownership can cause both upward and downward divergences in AC.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In increasingly dynamic and competitive environments, the capacity to acquire and exploit 
external knowledge – that is, absorptive capacity (AC; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) – is crucial for 
firms to innovate, renew their competitive advantage, and sustain performance (Lewin et al., 2011; 
Schildt et al., 2012; Vasudeva and Anand 2011; Volberda et al., 2010; Wales et al., 2013). Scholars 
have observed the benefits of AC and the considerable heterogeneity in this capacity across firms 
operating under similar external conditions (Cassiman an&d Veugelers, 2006; Jansen et al., 2005; 
Lane et al., 2001; Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008). Theoretically understanding the firm-level 
antecedents and mechanisms of AC has therefore become a key objective in management and 
organization research (see Lane et al., 2006; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Volberda et al., 2010).  
This literature, however, so far does not consider the crucial influence of firm ownership, in 
particular family ownership. It is surprising that, with increasing research attention being focused to 
uncover the internal drivers of AC, scholars have examined the role of managers independently of 
firm ownership (Lane et al., 2006; Nag & Gioia, 2012; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Volberda et al., 
2010). Similarly, empirical research places considerably more emphasis on widely held, 
professionally managed firms (e.g., Ben-Oz & Greve, 2012; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Rothaermel & 
Alexandre, 2009) than on family owned firms that are prominent in most economies (La Porta et 
al., 1999). By ignoring firm ownership, existing theories tend to overlook the role of powerful 
actors who may influence key strategic decisions (Carney, 2005; Chrisman & Patel, 2012) and the 
emotional concerns possibly deriving from their affective and social ties with the firm (Cruz et al., 
2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Introducing family ownership and integrating emotional aspects 
in the theory of AC enables moving beyond the structural and overly rational views of this capacity 
(Lane et al., 2006; Volberda et al., 2010). It enables a deeper understanding of the cognitive 
processes that lead some firms to succeed in changing technological environments while others are 
blindsided by the new knowledge and fail (Levinthal & March, 1993; Zahra & George, 2002). 
To address outstanding issues in the literature and recent calls for deeper theoretical 
understanding of the internal antecedents of AC (Lane et al., 2006; Volberda et al., 2010), we aim 
to integrate and extend the literatures on AC and family firms by answering the following 
questions: What are the mechanisms through which family ownership influences the level of firm 
AC? Under which conditions is family ownership beneficial or detrimental to potential and realized 
AC? How does the influence of family ownership on AC evolve over time? 
 
THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN FIRM OWNERSHIP AND AC 
AC is the ability to acquire and exploit external knowledge to extend or renew existing 
knowledge stocks and use such resources to innovate and gain a competitive advantage (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006; Zahra & George, 2002). In the following, we build on Zahra and 
George’s (2002) distinction between potential AC, which refers to the knowledge funnel that 
determines which external information crosses the firm’s boundaries (i.e., knowledge acquisition, 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Van den Bosch et al., 1999), and realized AC, which refers to transforming 
the externally acquired knowledge into valuable outputs (i.e., knowledge exploitation, Narasimhan 
et al., 2006; Tsai, 2001).  
Research on AC has largely been developed in the context of widely held, professionally-
managed firms, thereby disregarding the important influence of firm owners and assuming they 
have limited willingness and ability to influence the decisions and processes involved in the use of 
external knowledge. This assumption is problematic considering that firm owners can exert 
considerable influence (Connelly et al., 2010; David et al., 2001; Hoskisson et al., 2002). This lack 
of integration is especially an issue when considering that family ownership, predominant in most 
countries and industries (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999), can create strong affective and social ties within 
the firm, ultimately implying that socio-emotional considerations play a prominent role in decision-
making (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). This calls into question the overly rational view of AC 
developed in prior research (Lane et al., 2006; Volberda et al., 2010), suggesting that only limited 
understanding of AC is achieved when not explicitly taking into account the role of family owners, 
including their emotions and power, in shaping firm behavior.  
 
FAMILY OWNERSHIP AS AN INTERNAL DRIVER OF AC 
 
Although no studies directly examine the influence of family ownership on AC, research in related 
areas indicates the importance and potential complexity of this relation. Prior studies examine a 
number of aspects related to family ownership that, albeit indirectly, have implications for AC. For 
example, there is considerable interest in the influence of family ownership on R&D investments 
(e.g., Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013; Patel & Chrisman, 2014; 
Sirmon et al., 2008), typically seen as a proxy of a firm’s stock of prior knowledge and often 
associated with AC (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2001). R&D investments are however 
only a weak predictor of AC (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Tortoriello, 2015; Volberda et al., 2010) and 
such emphasis overshadows other important aspects of the processes through which firms acquire 
and exploit external knowledge. Research on technology acquisitions (Kotlar et al., 2013) indicates 
important consequences of family ownership on potential AC. Relatedly, research examining 
knowledge internalization within the family (Chirico & Salvato, 2014) and knowledge 
recombination in the family firm (Patel & Fiet, 2011) offers further insights into the knowledge 
structures of family firms, which are critical to their ability to acquire external knowledge (Volberda 
et al., 2010). Some authors provide insights on the influence of family ownership on realized AC 
such as Block (2012) who focuses on the ability to turn R&D investments into patents, Patel and 
Chrisman (2014) who examine explorative and exploitative R&D investments, and König et al. 
(2013) who offer a model of organizational constraints to discontinuous technology adoption.  
Collectively, prior research suggests that family ownership is likely to be an important 
antecedent of a firm’s AC. However, most prior studies do not differentiate the different effects of 
family ownership on knowledge acquisition and exploitation. Moreover, no theoretical framework 
acknowledges the simultaneous positive and negative effects that operate through different 
mechanisms. Finally, knowledge of how the influence of family owners varies across populations 
of firms is nascent at best (e.g., Chua et al., 2012). For these reasons, it is not possible to extrapolate 
from existing research to form an overarching framework that explains the mechanisms through 
which family owners influence AC and the conditions under which family ownership is beneficial 
or detrimental to the firm capability to acquire and exploit external knowledge. To address this 
issue, we develop a model of the influence of family owners on firm behavior and use this to build 
our analysis of its consequences on AC. 
 
INFLUENCE OF FAMILY OWNERS 
Conceptualizations of family ownership and organizational consequences vary across theoretical 
frameworks and empirical studies, ranging from broad concepts such as socio-emotional wealth 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) and familiness (Habbershon et al., 2003) to more granular 
conceptualizations deconstructing the influence of family owners into its multiple components (e.g., 
the “Four Cs” model, Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; the “Three Ps”, Carney, 2005).  
Our conceptualization converges toward two main constructs, emotional attachment and power 
concentration, that respectively qualify the role of family owners in governing the firm’s strategy 
and structure. In particular, we propose that the influence of family owners on the strategy and 
structure of a firm will vary depending on the strength of their emotional attachment to the firm and 
the degree of power concentration in the family. As several scholars note, strategy and structure are 
inextricably linked and adjust to one another in the long term (Chandler, 1962; Hall & Saias, 1980), 
so we do not rule out the existence of reciprocal effects between the two dimensions. However, 
these dimensions highlight different aspects of family influence that can vary independently from 
one another, at least in the short term. Thus, elaborating on these two dimensions separately 
facilitates theorizing about their distinct effects. This allows avoiding the weaknesses of “umbrella 
constructs” and artificial dichotomies between family and non-family firms (e.g., Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2014). It also allows broadening the applicability of our theory to other classes of 
owners with different configurations of emotional attachment and power concentration.  
 
MECHANISMS LINKING FAMILY OWNERSHIP TO AC 
Drawing on prior literature, we have distilled two dimensions, emotional attachment and power 
concentration, that qualify the type of family owner influence and position the different forms that it 
can take within a multi-faceted continuum in relation to shaping firm strategy and structure. We use 
these two dimensions to build a theory on the mechanisms linking family ownership to AC. There 
is currently no theory of the effects of family ownership on AC, which constitutes a major 
knowledge gap. Based on corporate governance, cognitive psychology, and AC research, we 
elaborate on the model of family owner influence illustrated in the previous section to examine the 
specific mechanisms through which family ownership can influence knowledge acquisition and 
exploitation. This analysis allows considering the contingency factors that contribute to determining 
the ultimate effect of family ownership on AC. 
 
Proposition 1 (P1): Family ownership influences the firm’s AC through emotional attachment, such 
that the strength of family owner emotional attachment (a) decreases the level of potential AC and 
(b) increases the level of realized AC.  
 
Proposition 2 (P2): Family ownership influences the firm’s AC through power concentration, such 
that the extent of power concentration (a) increases the level of potential AC and (b) decreases the 
level of realized AC. 
 
THE PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP ON AC 
 
Our analysis has identified two key mechanisms through which family ownership can facilitate and 
hamper AC. Specifically, we argue that family ownership hinders the development of potential AC 
but assists the development of realized AC as the family owners’ emotional attachment to the firm 
strengthens. Conversely, family ownership has a positive effect on potential AC and a negative 
effect on realized AC as power is concentrated in family owners. As such, our analysis suggests that 
the influence exerted by family ownership on AC through emotional attachment and power 
concentration is misaligned and therefore has decisive implications on the ultimate effect of family 




With respect to potential AC, power concentration endows family owners with greater discretion 
and latitude of action (Carney, 2005). Thus, power concentration increases the firm’s ability to 
search broadly, without the need to observe bureaucratic or administrative constraints. 
Nevertheless, the emotional attachment of family owners leads these decision-makers to undervalue 
external knowledge (König et al., 2013; Kotlar et al., 2013) and hence reduces the firm’s 
willingness to acquire knowledge outside existing domains. In other words, the combination of the 
positive effects associated with power concentration and the negative effects associated with 
emotional attachment suggests that family ownership affects potential AC in both upward and 
downward directions, possibly resulting in extremely high and extremely low degrees of potential 
AC depending on the specific combination of emotional attachment and power concentration in the 
respective firm. We can thus reasonably expect to observe higher heterogeneity in potential AC 
across firms with higher degrees of family ownership. The dotted box in Figure 1 illustrates the 
possible effects of family ownership on potential AC, where the upper and lower limits respectively 
represent a firm’s willingness to acquire external knowledge and its ability to do so. The actual level 
of potential AC, illustrated by the gray area in Figure 1, will become higher (lower) as the 
motivation gap between willingness and ability becomes smaller (larger). The consequences of 
family ownership on potential AC are difficult to predict due to the inconsistency of the effect on 
the strategy and structure dimensions. The ultimate effect depends primarily on the motivation gap 
between the greater ability and lower willingness to acquire external knowledge, and thus on 





With respect to realized AC, the reluctance towards external knowledge caused by family owner 
emotional attachment lessens and is replaced by incentives to exploit the acquired knowledge 
resources for commercial ends (Carney, 2005; Duran et al., 2015; Patel & Chrisman, 2014). Thus, 
emotional attachment increases the firm’s willingness to exploit external knowledge once acquired. 
Yet, power concentration in family owners isolates them from the rest of the organization (Ibarra, 
1992), which reduces the incentive of lower-rank managers and employees to actually implement 
such new knowledge in existing processes and products (Lenox & King, 2004; Patel & Cooper, 
2014). Thus, power concentration reduces the firm’s ability to exploit newly acquired knowledge. 
For these reasons, as for potential AC, the simultaneous influence of emotional attachment and 
power concentration can reasonably increase the heterogeneity of realized AC among firms. The 
possible effects of family ownership on realized AC are illustrated in the dotted box in Figure 1. 
The actual level of realized AC (the gray area in the figure) will become higher (lower) as the 
implementation gap between ability and willingness to exploit external knowledge becomes smaller 
(larger). Therefore, our analysis suggests that the ultimate effect of family ownership on realized 
AC varies according to the size of the implementation gap between the family owner’s higher 
willingness and lower ability to acquire external knowledge and thus depends on contingencies that 
increase or decrease the influence of family owners on firm structure through power concentration. 
 
CONTINGENCIES DETERMINING FAMILY OWNERSHIP EFFECTS ON AC 
 
Our analysis suggests that family ownership is an important internal driver of AC heterogeneity but 
such influence can be both positive and negative. By outlining the two key mechanisms through 
which family ownership influences potential and realized AC, namely, emotional attachment and 
power concentration, our theoretical approach helps identify and classify the contingency factors 
that, by operating on the specific mechanisms outlined above, can cause positive or negative family 
ownership effects to prevail. 
 
Proposition 3 (P3): Ceteris paribus, the motivation gap becomes larger and the negative effect of 
family ownership on potential AC prevails when (a) family owners strongly identify with the firm or 
(b) family owners have strong family control intentions. 
 Proposition 4 (P4): Ceteris paribus, the motivation gap becomes smaller and the positive effect of 
family ownership on potential AC prevails when (a) the firm faces negative performance feedbacks 
or (b) the firm faces control threats. 
 
Proposition 5 (P5): Ceteris paribus, the implementation gap becomes larger and the negative effect 
of family ownership on realized AC prevails in the presence of (a) a family CEO or (b) family 
members involved in top management. 
 
Proposition 6 (P6): Ceteris paribus, the implementation gap becomes smaller and the positive 
effect of family ownership on realized AC prevails in the presence of (a) high family ownership 
dispersion or (b) institutional investments. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This article contributes insights that extend current understanding of AC by introducing firm 
ownership in the debate on its organizational antecedents. Focusing on the consequences of firm 
ownership in terms of how firms manage external knowledge acquisition and exploitation, our 
analysis extends the current AC discussion beyond purely rational considerations to explain how 
emotional concerns affect the cognitive mechanisms underlying AC.  
Our analysis shows two key paradoxes, the motivation and implementation gaps, reflecting the 
tension between the firm’s willingness to develop AC and its ability to do so. The notion that AC 
requires both ability and willingness is implicit in prior conceptualization of the construct (e.g., 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006). However, most research into the antecedents of AC is 
limited to an ability-based view that takes willingness for granted. The antecedents that influence a 
firm’s willingness to acquire and exploit external knowledge are empirically less scrutinized than 
the firm’s ability to do so (Lane et al., 2006; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Volberda et al., 2010), 
which constitutes a further research area.  
By examining the influence of family owners on AC, this article also addresses an 
important debate on innovation in family firms (De Massis et al., 2013). Our theoretical analysis 
goes beyond previous approaches by advancing a systematic reconceptualization of family owner 
influence and reconciles the divergent views by differentiating the effect of family ownership on 
external knowledge exploration and exploitation. Our focus on AC allows reconciling the divergent 
views by highlighting the contradictions between firm owner emotional attachment and power 
concentration in relation to external knowledge. In particular, we demonstrate that these 
contradictory dimensions produce motivation and implementation gaps that explain why family 
ownership can increase the heterogeneity and variability of AC. 
This analysis not only sheds light on the mechanisms underlying AC in family owned firms, 
but leads to understanding the importance of contingency factors and temporal aspects to predict the 
consequences of family ownership on innovation.  
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